This research, conducted through an analytical-deductive method, aims to explore the jurisprudential feasibility of criminalizing acts that are sacrilegious to Sharia but are performed with religious motives. The central issue is to articulate the principles of Islamic criminal policy in dealing with actions that, despite being religiously intended, result in the defamation (Wahn) of religion. Initially, by deconstructing the concepts of “crime,” “Wahn,” and “motive,” it was determined that a religious motive does not alter the fundamental criminal nature of an act. Subsequently, by examining legal principles (such as the rule of law) and major jurisprudential rules (like Ta’zir and Hifz al-Nizam), a framework for assessing the legitimacy of criminalization was established.

Next, the concept of “defamation of religion” (Wahn al-Din) as a main pillar of the discussion was examined. The study of its juridical dimensions from the perspective of primary, secondary, and governmental rulings, as well as the analysis of challenges such as the fluidity of the concept of Wahn, its conflict with the stability of Sharia, the possibility of over-exception (Takhsis al-Akthar), and the risk of undermining the religion’s robustness, showed that criminalization based on Wahn without a clear criterion can lead to widespread conflicts in the legislative sphere. Therefore, the capacities of concepts like enjoining good and forbidding evil at the governmental level, the ruling on the execution of extremists (Ghulat), and the evidence for the rule of Ta’zir (including general and specific narrations, consensus, rational proof, and the interest of preserving the system) play a decisive role as authoritative sources in providing a standard and defensible jurisprudential basis for criminalization.

In the final section, focusing on the conflict between “personal fatwa” and “governmental decree,” it was proven that the rule of the sovereign’s binding decree is the solution for public matters. This finding was applied in case studies (such as the prohibition of Qama-zani). The ultimate conclusion is that criminalizing these acts, through the issuance of a governmental decree and its subsequent legislation, is both jurisprudentially legitimate and, from a criminal policy perspective, possible and necessary.