In the tradition of Islamic philosophy, foundationalism has been accepted as a theory for justification of knowledge among the majority of Muslim thinkers, especially the three school-founder philosophers–—i.e. Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Suhrawardi and Mulla Sadra. Addressing this topic, due to infinite regress, they all have discussed the necessity of basic and self-evident propositions, perfect definition as a method of obtaining non-basics conceptions, and deduction as a method of obtaining basic judgment. The question of this research is why the tradition of Islamic philosophy is predominated by foundationalism in the justification of knowledge.

Rorty, one of the American pragmatist philosophers, suggests the importance of discussing language and history, using the Ironism (as opposed to metaphysics), in examining issues. According to Rorty, the use of a specific language game, affected by hidden metaphors emerging from the beliefs and lives of people, determines the intellectual orientation of thinkers.

Investigating the question of the research using the ironism of Richard Rorty provides evidence in favor of the hypothesis that suggests metaphors about knowledge in the minds of philosophers, the extension of this metaphor into their language, and finally,the orientation of their thoughts based on a specific language game, has led to the formation and extension of foundationalism in the field of knowledge. In this language game, knowledge is considered a hierarchy such as a building, reminiscent of a structural foundationalism. This claim, arising from Richard Rorty’s behaviorism, considers the choice of foundationalism to be not only the product of rational arguments and proofs, but the product of two main assumptions: firstly, the duality of mind and object, and secondly, the acceptance of hierarchy as the governing model of knowledge and existence, determined by the religious beliefs and living conditions of philosophers. Therefore, survival of foundationalism in the tradition of Islamic philosophy requires a jargon appropriate to its denotative type. Otherwise, by changing presuppositions, this theory can be overlooked in favor of new theories in the justification of knowledge.