

object to which the concept (the "logical universal") applies, e.g., man, animal. The third is the combination of (1) and (2), e.g., man as a universal, animal as a universal, etc.

2. In this passage, "first Emanation" means the "First Intellect (*'aql awwal*), in which all possible things are contained potentially in the form of a metaphysical Unity. Since the Absolute has no "quiddity," but is sheer "existence," the First Emanation from It should necessarily be simple without any composition.

3. Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191) is the leading representative figure in the entire history of Islam philosophy, of the position that "existence" is something mentally posited, and not fundamentally real. Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī, or *Shaykh al-Ishrāq*, as he is often referred to by the honorary title, is the founder of an important gnostic tradition in Iran known as Illuminism (*ishraqīyāh*), and his teachings has played an exceedingly important role in the spiritual life of Islam, particularly in Shi'ism.

4. "Essentials" (*dhātīyāt*): genus, species, and differentia.

5. I.e., Peripatetic Philosophers and Illuminationists.

6. The "illuminative" relation is a relation consisting of only one term (i.e., the source of illumination), so that the relation becomes actualized by the very existence of the source. For example: the relation which exists between the soul and intelligible forms, since the soul as the source of illumination creates its own objects. The "categorical" relation, on the contrary, is a relation subsisting between two terms, so that it cannot be actualized unless there be actualized the object of relation. For example: what is observable in the phenomenon of empirical knowledge (*'ilm ḥuṣūlī*), which is a relation between the perceiving subject and an already existent object.

7. This argument refers to one of the classical proofs for the oneness of God. If there were two Necessary Beings, both would share the property of being-necessary. At the same time, each one must have something which would distinguish it from the other. This would entail that each be a composition of a common element and a distinguishing element. But this consequent is absurd because God is essentially simple and not composite. This is what is known as the proof of the oneness of God by means of the concept of "composition" (*tarkīb*) Sabzavārī refers here to this particular proof in order to show that this proof itself cannot remain valid unless the position is taken that "existence" is fundamentally real, and not "quiddity." For if one takes the position of "quiddity" being fundamentally real, one will have to admit that the two Necessary Beings would completely be different from each other, having absolutely no common element between them, because on this supposition each one of the two Necessary Beings would be nothing other than a "quiddity," and because all "quiddities" are by definition essentially different from one another. This naturally leads to the conclusion that, on the supposition of "quiddity" being real, the famous proof by "composition" would not remain valid.

8. *Qur'an*, LIV, 50.

9. *Qur'an*, II, 115.